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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATUS OF TRESPASS LAWS IN OKLAHOMA

AS THEY AFFECT RANCHERS AND FARMERS

The ranchers and farmers of Oklahoma have expressed their
concern as to the status of the trespass laws of this state and their
effect upon the rights and liabilities of the members of the agricultural community. This paper will attempt to categorize some
of the more significant statutes and court decisions in this area
and point out the changes that have been made in the law. The
subject matter has been divided into two main headings: the first
will deal with perhaps the more important topic- that of trespass by domestic animals and its consequences to the owner while
the latter part of the article will deal with personal trespass.
I. TRESPASS BY LIVESTOCK

Prior to 1965 the law with regard to trespassing domestic

animals was found under various sections of the Oklahoma herd
law.' Effective January 1, 1966, a significant portion of the herd
law was repealed.! The most important feature of the new legislation is the fact that open range counties are no longer permitted'
nor does the law any longer permit the creation of stock districts
wherein livestock could run at large throughout the district.4 The
, Okla. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 117, § 2.
now provides that

[ail domestic
WE...
animals shall be restrained by the owner thereof at all times and seasons
of the year from running at large in the State of Oklahoma. Damages
sustained by reason of such domestic animals trespassing upon the lands
of another shall be recovered in a manner provided by law. For the
purpose of this act, domestic animals shall include cattle, horses, swine,
sheep, goats, and all other animals not considered wild but shall not include domestic house pets."
3OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 94 (1961), which has now been repealed, Okla.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 117, § 2, provided that all domestic animals were
to be restrained by their owner and all damages sustained by reason of
their trespass upon the lands of another could be recovered in a manner
provided by law. This section exempted certain counties from its operation (open range counties). The new law has invalidated these exemptions.
4
OKLA. STAT. tit. 4 § 101 et seq. (1961), repealed Okla. Sess. Laws
1965, ch. 117, § 2, provided that residents of any county within the state
could, by following the prescribed statutory procedure, create stock dis-

'OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98 (1965)
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owner of domestic animals in this state is under a strict statutory
duty to restrain those animals within the confines of the land
which he owns or occupies.' This duty is similar to that which was
imposed upon the owner of domestic animals at common law.
Under the common law rule, the owner of domestic animals kept
them at his peril and was strictly liable for any damages resulting
from his failure to keep the animals properly restrained. Liability
for damages resulting from trespassing animals did not depend
upon whether the owner was negligent in allowing them to escape
except in cases where the animals were being driven on the highway in which case proof of negligence on the part of the owner
was necessary to recover for damages the animals caused.! If the
animals committed a trespass upon the lands of another the fact
that the land intruded upon was improperly fenced was immaterial

since no one was required to fence against domestic animals in

the absence of an agreement to that effect.' The common law rule

was eventually modified in a number of states through the enact-

ment of fencing laws under which cultivated lands were required
to be fenced before the landowner could recover damages from
the owner of livestock which had broken through a fence and intruded upon the land.! With the increased cultivation of lands
which had formerly been used primarily for open grazing pur-

poses, many state legislatures utimately enacted herd laws or

tricts. Once these districts were created, owners of trespassing domestic
animals could not be held liable for the damages the animals caused

unless they intruded upon land fenced for agricultural purposes pursuant
to OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 115.3 (1961) repealed Okla. Sess. Laws
1965, ch. 117, §2. The land owner also could not be enjoined from allowing his livestock to run at large throughout the district. See Inselman v.
Berryman, 180 Okla. 136, 68 P. 2d 527 (1937).
'Foster and Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Oklahoma, At Common
Law and Under Statutes, 3 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 15, 192 (1950).
'Id. at 12.
'3 C.J.S. Animals § 185 (1936); Miller v. Parvin, 111 Kan. 444, 207
Pac. 826 (1922); Raziano v. T. J. James and Co., Inc., 57 So.2d 251
(La. CA. 1952); Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d
1022 (1959; Molton v. Young, 204 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.

1947).

'Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 121 P.2d 640 (1942);- McKee v.
Clark, 115 Mont. 438, 144 P.2d 1000 (1944); Stewart v. Oberholtzer,
57 NM. 253, 258 P.2d 369 (1953); Molton v. Young, supra note 7.
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"fencing in" statutes. Under these laws the owner of domestic
animals was prohibited from allowing them to run at large outside
the confines of his own land. The effect of such legislation was a
reinstatement of the common law rule of strict liability with the
result that owners of livestock were once again required to restrain
their animals at their peril and were held strictly liable for their
failure to do so.'
It was held in an early Kansas case"0 that herd laws repeal
fencing statutes to the extent that the herd laws impose liability
upon the owner of livestock which trespass upon the land of
another even though such land is not enclosed by a fence." The
Oklahoma law is rather confusing in this area since the statutes
not only provide that the owner of domestic animals must keep
them restrained at all times but also provide for a fencing law12 under which the owner of any trespassing domestic animal "... . shall

be liable for all damages done by animals breaking through or
over lawful fences and trespassing upon the enclosed land of
another ... ." In an early Oklahoma decision, 3 the Supreme Court
ruled that in counties wherein livestock was permitted to run
at large, the owner of livestock which broke through a fence
enclosing cultivated farm land couldn't be held liable for the
resulting damages to crops enclosed therein unless the area was
protected by a lawful fence.' Since Oklahoma law no longer permits cattlemen to run their stock at large in any county within the
'3 CJ.S. Animals § 185 (1936); PRossEm, ToRTs § 75 (3rd ed. 1964);
Miller v. Parvin, sapra note 7.
"Miller v. Parvin, supra note 7.
Casad, The Kansas Law of Livestock Trespass, 10 KAN. L. REV. 55,
62 (1961).
2
OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 155 (1961).
3
" Bottems v. Clark, 38 Okla. 243, 132 Pac. 903 (1913).
sets out the requirements for a law1OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 154 (1961)

ful fence in Oklahoma. The fence is lawful under this section if it is

constructed of three rails or three boards not less than six inches wide
and three quarters of an inch thick. Fence posts must not be more than
ten feet apart where rails are used and not more than eight feet apart
where boards are used. Any other fence, which, in the opinion of the
fence viewers is equivalent to such a fence is lawful provided, that the
lowest rail, wire or board is not more than twenty nor less than sixteen
inches from the ground. The fence must be at least fifty-four inches
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state, this decision no longer would appear to have any validity. It
does serve, however, to show the extent of the obligation that was
placed upon the farmer in open range counties or stock districts if
he was to recover damages to his crops or land resulting from
trespassing livestock. Obviously, the new law reverses this obligation by placing a statutory duty upon the landowner to fence his
livestock in rather than upon a neighboring landowner to fence
the animals out.
The only problem that might arise under the Oklahoma law
in its present state with regard to lawful fences would be the construction of OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 155, which seems to predicate
recovery of damages sustained by reason of trespassing domestic
animals upon proof of a breaking "... through or over lawful
fences... ." Prior to the 1965 revisions in the herd law, in counties
wherein livestock was restrained by law from running at large,
the owner of trespassing domestic animals was, as he is now,
liable for the damages that resulted from the trespass." Likewise,
where several owners shared a tract of land enclosed by a common
fence and part of the tract was cultivated and a part used for grazing purposes, the occupant of the portion devoted to pasture was
bound to prevent his livestock from trespassing upon the crops
of the other occupant.'6 Strict liability of the owner for damages
resulting from the trespass of his livestock is-not a new concept
in this state. It has existed since the inception of the herd law;
all that is new in the law is the extent of its application. Thus, in
light of the older case law and recent legislation requiring all
domestic animals to be restrained at all times in every county
within the state, OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 155 is not to be construed
to mean that liability can exist only if the injured party shows that
he has constructed a lawful fence which is subsequently broken by
in height Barb wire fences may be constructed of three barb wires or
of four wires, two of which are barbed and which are fastened to posts
not more than two rods apart with two stays between them or to posts

not more than one rod apart where stays are not used. The top wire
must be at least fifty-four inches from the ground but may not exceed
fifty-eight inches in height; and, the bottom wire may not be placed
more than twenty or less than sixteen inches from the ground.
"SHoltz v. Connor, 129 Okla. 235, 264 Pac. 604 (1928).
' 6Willis v. Davis, 333 P.2d 311 (Okla. 1958).
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the defendant's livestock. On the contrary, the owner of livestock
is required to fence them in at all times. In the event the animals
escape, the question of the owners liability might well depend
upon whether the statutory requirements of a lawful fence have
been met," assuming he is without fault in allowing the animals
to escape.
Normally, violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se;
that is, the plantiff is not required to prove all the elements of
common law negligence that would otherwise be required in the
absence of the statutory violation.18 The concept is applicable only
if the plaintiff can show that the violation was the proximate
cause of the injuries complained of, and that he was a member of
the class of persons sought to be protected by the particular
statute. 9 For the exception of several counties which were exempted from the operation of the herd law and the statutory provisions
permitting the creation of stock districts, the older law was substantially similar to the revised version insofar as it prohibited
domestic animals from being allowed to run at large. Where the
obligations of the statute were not complied with, the stock owner
was strictly liable for all damages resulting therefrom," including
injuries to other animals caused by his trespassing stock.' Assuming the trespass proximately caused the injuries complained of,
the party who sustained injuries of this nature could recover on
the theory that violation of the statute constituted negligence per
se since the person and his injuries were within the purposes for
which the statute was enacted. In Champlin Refining Co. v,
Cooper,' the plaintiff was a motorist, and injuries were sustained
to his automobile as the result of a collision with a horse that
7OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 154 (1961).
'8 PRossER, ToRTs § 35 (3rd ed. 1964).
"Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okla. 153, 86 P.2d 61 (1938).
"Holtz v. Connor, sapra note 15; Harris v. Grey, 65 Okla. 187, 165 Pac.
1148 (1917); Holmberg v.Will, 52 Okla.745, 153 Pac. 832 (1916).
2 In Low v.Barnes, 30 Okla. 15, 118 Pac. 389 (1911), the court ruled

than an owner of livestock which were allowed to trespass upon the

land of another was liable not only for any injury to the plaintiff's land,
but liability extended to injuries to other livestock as well. Liability
existed without regard to whether the defendant had knowledge of his
animal's vicious propensities.
'Supra note 19.
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had wandered onto the highway from the defendant's premises.
It was held that damages could not be recovered on the mere
allegation of a statutory violation without an affirmative showing
of negligence in allowing the animal to escape its confines. The
court, in looking to the purpose for which OKLA. STAT. tit. 4,
§ 131 was enacted, stated that "... the statute was enacted for
the purpose of protecting agricultural crops from the ravages of
straying domestic animals rather than motorists upon the highway . . ."' and therefore, the plaintiff's failure to offer any evidence of the defendant's negligence in allowing the horse to
wander upon the highway was fatal to his cause of action.
Not until 1963 in Merkle v. Yarbrough' was the decision in
the Champlin case modified. Here the court was faced with the
question of whether the defendant, whose grazing lands were intruded upon by plaintiff's livestock, could lawfully take possession
of the cattle and sell them pursuant to the applicable sections of
the Oklahoma herd law.' The issue was whether the herd law
of Oklahoma applied only to farm land or whether its provisions
were applicable to the protection of grazing land as well. The
court held that the statutory language in OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, §§94
and 131, did not limit their application to agricultural crops
and/or land but included grazing lands as well. The court said
that ". . . any language employed in Champlin Refining Co. v.
Cooper... which might be construed to limit our herd laws as
being applicable to only 'agricultural crops and/or land' is specifically disavowed."'"
After the Merkle decision was handed down there was no
longer any question as to the extent of the application of the herd
law with regard to the kinds of land protected by the herd law.
It is clear that OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 94 and 131, protected the
owners of grazing lands as well as the owner of cultivated lands.
Although both of these sections have now been repealed, there is
nothing in the new legislation that would indicate that this same

Su'pra note 19, at 154, 86 P.2d at 64.
2378 P.2d 333 (Okla. 1963).

2sThe parties stipulated that the cattle were taken up and sold pursuant
OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 131, 135, 136 and 184.
26to
Merkle v. Yarbrough, supra note 24, at 335.
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protection has not been carried forward into the new law.2 The
Champlin decision has never been overruled by the Oklahoma
court insofar as it held that highway motorists are not within the
class of persons sought to be protected by the herd laws. Numerous
states have similar laws, ' some of which specifically provide that
their purpose is the protection of highway motorists as well as
landowners, while statutes in other states merely provide that it
shall be unlawful to allow livestock to run at large (as is the case
with the Oklahoma statute). Regardless of the wording of the
statutes however, several jurisdictions have ruled that such statutes
have as their purpose or as one of their purposes the protection of
highway motorists." Where such is the declared purpose of the
statute, proof of its violation would constitute negligence per se.
However, the great weight of authority seems to support the view
that one who allows his livestock to escape from their confinement
and wander upon a highway in violation of a statute, whereupon
they are struck by a motorist is not liable for the resulting damages
unless it can be shown that the owner was negligent in allowing
the animals to escape.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that the owner of
domestic animals is liable for damages to real estate caused by
reason of the animal's wrongful intrusion onto the land of another
and that such liability also extends to injuries to other animals as
well." Liability in such a case exists even though the owner of the
animals is unaware of their vicious propensities. Where an action
2'

OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98 (1965), which repealed the earlier sections
of the herd law under which the Champlin and Merkle cases arose,
provides that damages may be recovered ". . . [Bly reason of such
domestic animals trespassing upon lands of another . . .." The language of the new section is substantially similar to that which was employed
by the older law.
2 Statutes
of surrounding states which are somewhat similar to our own
include: Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 1140 (1947); Colorado: COL. STAT. Rnv. ANN. ch. 8, Art. 13-2 (1963); Kansas: K.S.A.
47-304 to 311 (1963); Texas: TEx.Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 6938, 6939,

6943, 6965-6971 (1925).
"See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1328, 1337 (1958).
' 0Id. at 1340; See also Scanlan v. Smith, 66 Wash.2d 601, 404 P.2d 776
(1965).
3 Low
v. Barnes, supra note 21.
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was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as
a result of trespassing livestock, a different result was reached by
the Colorado court however.' There it was held that a statute imposing strict liability upon the owner of livestock for damages to
grass, garden and vegetable products' had no application to a
suit for personal injuries caused by a trespassing horse since the
statute applied only to damages to land and not to personal injuries. Different results have been reached in other states which
have allowed recovery for personal injuries on the theory that the
injuries complained of were consequences of the trespass.
Though the owner is strictly liable for the damages his animals
cause while wrongfully upon the land of another, he is not absolutely liable for every harm they might cause. In other words,
the owner of domestic animals is not an insurer' against all the
harms his animals might cause; nor is he precluded from asserting
any defenses he might otherwise avail himself of in other forms of
tort litigation.' Certainly the issue of whether the livestock was
restrained by a lawful fence prior to the time of their escape
would have a significant bearing upon the question of the owners
ability to foresee the occurence of a trespass and the harms which
would result therefrom.
We now turn to the landowners remedies that are available
in the event of a trespass by livestock. Prior to 1965, Oklahoma
law provided that a landowner who sustained damages to his
crops and/or grazing lands had the option to recover those
damages in an action at law or to distrain the trespassing animals
'Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 355 P.2d 117 (1960).
' See Colorado statute cited supra note 28.
'See Annot, 88 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963).
s IPRossim, TORTS § 78 (3rd ed. 1964); Annot., spra note 34, at 720;
See Harris v. Roy, 108 So.2d 7 (La. C.A. 1958) wherein the Louisiana

Court of Appeals ruled that, although the owner of domestic animals
is not an insurer against all those damages the animals might cause, the
burden is upon the owner to show that ". . . he was without the slightest
fault and that he did all that was possible to prevent an injury by his

cattle...."
*' FosTER and KEmEN, spra note 5, at 214. It is suggested that '...s trict
liability does not make the defendant an insurer. There are a number of
recognized exceptions and limitations on the doctrine ......
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and hold them in some safe place until damages were paid." The
statutes of this state no longer expressly provide that the landowner shall have this right.' The question then arises as to whether
OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98 may still be construed as providing this
right by implication. Does the language of that statute which
states that ". . . [dlamages . . . shall be recovered in a manner
provided by law.. ." mean that the injured party has the option
to sue for damages or to distrain the trespassing animals until
damages inflicted by them have been paid, or does this section only
give the injured party the right to sue for damages in an action at
law? The Legislature failed to make itself clear on this point when
it repealed OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 131. The only logical conclusion
that can be reached in this regard is that the Legislature intended
that the injured party should retain the election of remedies available under the old law. This conclusion is based upon the fact
that all statutory provisions dealing with the procedure to be
followed subsequent to actual distraint of trespassing animals
remain in effect." Consequently, the right to distrain trespassing
animals still exists by implicatigo under OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98
which incorporated the remedies provided by OKLA. STAT. tit. 4,
§ 132 et seq.
Once steps are taken to distrain trespassing animals the party
taking the action must substantially comply with the applicable
statutes, or any action taken thereunder is void.4 When a trespassing animal has been distrained, the distraining party must
notify the owner of the animals, if the owner is known, within
forty-eight hours after distraint. If no response is made by the
owner the injured party must, within twenty-four hours thereafter,
"OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 131 (1961), repealed Okla. Sess. Laws 1965,
ch. 117, §2.

"OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98, which repealed section 131, surpra note 37,
but left several sections following section 131 in force, now provides
that

"...

[DIamages sustained by reason of such domestic animals

trespassing upon lands of another shall be recovered ina manner pro.
vided by Law (Emphasis added)."
"OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 132-136 (1961).
4
McCown v. Johnson, 387 P.2d 618 (Okla. 1964); Bodovitz v. Kincheloe, 178 Okla. 442, 63 P.2d 100 (1937); Keel v. Jones, 174 Okla. 363,
50 P.2d 330 (1935); Harley v. Moncrief, 171 Okla. 139, 41 P.2d 56
(1935); Hadden v. Fisher, 154 Okla. 228, 7 P.2d 488 (1932).
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notify a justice of the peace to come on the premises to assess
damages which will include a reasonable amount for seizing and
retaining the animal. If the owner fails to pay the damages as
they are assessed, notices will be posted stating that the stock will
be sold at public auction to cover the damages. 1 The notice required by statute to be given by the distraining party to the livestock owner need not be in writing,42 but other provisions of the
statute, such as the forty-eight and twenty-four hour notice requirements, must be met in order to show substantial compliance
with the statute' The distraining party must exercise care in the
retention of the animals. Even though the distraining party has
.legal possession of stock that trespass upon his land, ".. . [the
property of the trespasser cannot be needlessly injured... [and]
...when it is shown that such property has been injured through
or by the wrongful or willful conduct of the custodian ... " he
will become a trespasser from the beginning."
Under Oklahoma law, any party who removes stock from
distrant without consent of the distraining party is not only guilty
of a misdemeanor but is also liable in a suit by the distraining
party for the recovery of the animals or for damages and costs
if the distraining party so elects.' However, this does not mean
the owner of the animals is without a remedy to recover his stock
back from the distraining party. Any person aggrieved by an
assessment of damages by a justice of the peace pursuant to OKLA.
STAT. tit. 4, § 135 may appeal the assessment as any other judgment of a justice of the peace may be appealed." If a proper bond
is filed and the appellant is the owner of the distrained animals,
the animals will be delivered to him upon approval of the bond
" OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 135 (1961).
42McDonald
v. Cobb, 54 Okla. 365, 154 Pac. 345 (1916).
'

McCown v. Johnson, supra note 40.

' 4Parker v. Luce, 97 Okla. 101, 223 Pac. 122 (1924).
SOKLA.STAT.tit. 4, § 132 (1961).
'6OKLA.STAT.tit. 4, § 136 (1961).
"OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 136 (1961) provides that a bond must be filed
with a justice of the peace in an amount double the value of the property distrained. If the value of the property distrained exceeds the
amount of damages claimed, the bond must be in an amount of double
the damages claimed.
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by the justice of the peace. If the appellant is able to show that
there has not been substantial compliance with the statute, the
justice of the peace will never have taken proper jurisdiction over
the matter and the court to which the appeal is taken must dismiss

the case.'8

Aside from civil liability for allowing domestic animals to trespass upon the lands of others, the owner of such animals could
also be criminally prosecuted for violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 4,
§ 94. Although this section has now been repealed, criminal
responsibility imposed by the earlier statute remains unaffected by
the new legislation.4 In a case brought under the old statute, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "... [t]he purpose of this statute is to penalize the owners of livestock for permitting them to run at large ....

."" The

court went on to say that

before a person may be criminally prosecuted under the statute
there must be such a purpose on the part of the owner as would
indicate an indifference as to whether they were restrained or not
(citations omitted) .... ""
II. PERSONAL TRESPASS
In the area of personal trespass the statutes define the offense
and provide the liability for violation of the law whether it be
criminal or civil or both. Normally, a simple trespass by an individual onto the land of another will involve nothing more than
nominal damages in the absence of any other injury to the land.
The Oklahoma statutes define a number of offenses based on the
theory of trespass and most of these offenses involve minor criminal liability. Besides the statutes dealing specifically with criminal
offenses against property, several other related matters will be discussed in this portion of the paper.
Under the provisions of the Oklahoma forcible entry and
detainer statute52 anyone who uses, procures, encourages, or assists
4Newland v. Hatten, 92 Okla. 207, 218 Pac. 822 (1923); McCown v.
40.
4 Johnson, supra note
1OKLA. STAT. tit. 4, § 98 (1965).
OHall v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 284, 285, 245 P.2d 132, 133 (1952).
"Id. at 286, 245 P.2d at 133.
s2OKia STAT. tit. 21, § 1351 (1961).
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another in using "... any force, or violence in entering upon or
detaining any lands or other possessions of another except in the
cases and manner allowed by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor." In
the old case of Foust v. Territory' the court, in discussing the
Oklahoma forcible entry and detainer statute, pointed out that it
created two separate offenses: one offense was the forcible entry
upon and the detention of the lands of another; while the other
was the forcible entering upon and detention of the possessions
of another.
One of the purposes of the statute is the protection of tenants
from forcible eviction from their leased premises without judicial
process. In addition to criminal sanctions, the Oklahoma statute
imposes stringent civil penalties for the forcible ejection or exclusion of a person from real property.' The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has ruled that the law is penal in effect and therefore, it
may not be enlarged through construction by judicial interpretation.' The reason for this strict construction being placed upon the
statute lies in the fact that a showing of forcible ejection or exclusion from real property will entitle the injured party to recover
treble damages. The term forcible entry or exclusion means
"... . force of an unusual kind which tends to bring about a breach
of the peace, such as an injury with a strongarm, or a multitude
of people, or in a riotous manner.., or with a threat or menace
to life or limb, or under circumstances which would naturally inspire fear."' A finding that the ejection was merely wrongful
without this additional element of force will preclude a recovery
of treble damages and the plantiff will be limited to the actual
damages he has sustained by reason of his ejection from the land.
As a substitute for forceful or violent means of ejecting persons from unauthorized possession of real estate, Oklahoma law
provides peaceable methods whereby removal from the land may
be accomplished according to law.' Once a person has been res8 Okla. 541, 58 Pac. 728 (1899).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 71 (1961), allows treble damages for the forceable ejection from real property.
-"Crow v. Davidson, 186 Okla. 84, 96 P.2d 70 (1939).
6Id. at 87, 96 P.2d at 72.
17OKLA. STAT. tit. 39, § 391 et seq. (1961).
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moved from possession of real property by process of law, such
person will be guilty of a misdemeanor if he returns to possession
of the property without authority.58 Thus, a landowner is limited
to peaceable methods of excluding persons wrongfully in possession of real property; but this does not mean that the landowner
is under any legal obligation to make his land safe for trespassers.
The only duty the landowner owes to the trespasser is to refrain
from wantonly or wilfully injuring him."'
Under Oklahoma law every person who commits a trespass
through acts such as cutting down timber upon the lands of
another; driving or riding through a cultivated hedge row, tree
row, grove of ornamental trees or orchard of fruit trees growing
upon the land of another; carrying away wood or timber which
has been previously cut down; or maliciously severing anything
produced from or attached to the land is guilty of a misdemeanor. This is a trespass statute under which a conviction may
be obtained if it is shown that the defendant has committed a
willful trespass by engaging in one of the acts enumerated by the
statute. Malice toward the owner of the property affected is not
'an element of the offense defined by the statute.6'
A statutory section62 provides that it shall be a felony for any
person to wantonly or wilfully remove, for commercial purposes,
without the consent of the owner, any stone from the land; to
injure cultivated timber growing on the land; or to wantonly or
wilfully let down any fence which encloses such cultivated timber
upon the land of another. Conviction for violation of the provisions of this statute carries with it not only criminal penaltie?
"'OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §

1352 (1961).

"Concho Construction Co. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 201 F.2d 673
(10th Cir. 1953); Ford v. U.S., 200 F.2d 272 (10th Cir. 1952); Keck
v. Woodring, 201 Okla. 665, 208 P.2d 1133 (1961); Ramage Mining
Co. v. Thomas, 172 Okla. 24, 44 P.2d 19 (1935); Kroger Grocery &

Baking Co. v. Roark, 171 Okla. 595, 43 P.2d 710 (1935).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1768 (1961).
"Smith
v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 297, 111 P.2d 198 (1941).
'2 0KLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1769 (1961).
63The statute provides that every person convicted of a violation thereof
... shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more
than five (5) years, or by fine of not more than One Thousand
6
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but the offender may be civilly liable as well. Prior to the revisions
that were made to this section in 1955, malice toward the owner
of the property affected was an essential element of the offense.'
The purpose of the revision is not clear; however, the statute is
probably aimed at preventing the trespass upon the land of another
for the purpose of removing stone or timber for commercial use
rather than malicious injury to the property owner.
For the malicious injury or destruction of the real or personal
property of another, Oklahoma law provides for criminal liability
as well as the recovery of treble damages in a civil action.' This
is the general malicious mischief statute, and malice toward the
owner of the property affected is obviously an element of the
offense defined by this section.' The Oklahoma statutes define
the term "malice" as importing "... . a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, established either by proof or presumption
of law."'67 Such malice must be directed toward the property owner
and an act done in good faith under claim of right will not support a conviction under the statute.' Thus, where an unregistered
bull was allowed to run at large, in violation of law, among a
herd of registered cows, the owners of the cows were not guilty of
malicious mischief when they "abated" the nuisance the bull had
Dollars ($1,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment, and shall be
liable in damages to the party injured."
"Prior to the 1955 amendments to this section it provided as follows:
"Every person who shall wantonly or maliciously cut, dig up, or injure
The amended version of the statute deletes
any timber set out ....
the word "maliciously" and adds the words "for commercial purposes
without the consent of the owner." Note that under the old version of
the statute a person convicted of "maliciously" committing one of the
enumerated acts was guilty of a misdemeanor and was punishable in the
county jail for a period not to exceed thirty days or by fine not to exceed One Hundred Dollars, or both. Compare this with the criminal
responsibility provided under the amended version of the statute, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1769 (1961).
"OKLA. STAT. tit 21, § 1760 (1961).
"Moran v. State, 316 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1957); Hummel v. State, 69 Okla.
Crim. 38, 99 P.2d 913 (1940); Lewis v. State, 55 Okla. Crim. 182, 27

P.2d 363 (1933). Thissen v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 437, 209 Pac. 224
(1922); Colbert v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 401, 124 Pac 78 (1912).
aOKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 95 (1961).
"Moran v. State, supra note 66.
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created in the most efficient way they knew how."
Ranchers and farmers face constant problems resulting from
unauthorized hunting and fishing upon their lands. This of course
is unlawful in the absence of consent from the owner or the occupier of the land.' However, the law provides that no consent is
required where the land is unoccupied unless a conspicuous notice
is posted upon the land by the owner or his agent. Prosecutions
for alleged violation of the statute can be commenced only by
written complaint filed in the proper court by the owner or occupier of the land or upon written complaint to an authorized game
ranger. Upon conviction for violation of the statute the offender
will be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished accordingly."
Another area of frequent concern to the rancher and farmer
is the pollution of his stock water or other streams due to the
placing of harmful substances therein. The problem of oil or
saltwater pollution is particularly predominant in Oklahoma as
a result of the substantial oil field operations that are carried on
here. Since this is an extensive topic in itself, the problems in this
area will not be comprehensively discussed, but, due to the importance of the subject, some mention of it should be made at
this point.
Two statutes deal with the problem of water pollution. One
provides that it shall be unlawful to place any deleterious substance including things such as dynamite and other explosives into
any stream, lake or pond within the state." The statute further
"In Hummel v. State, supra note 66, the owner of an unregistered bull
permitted the animal to run at large in violation of state law. When the
owners of certain thoroughbred cattle sought to "abate the nuisance"
created by the unregistered bull mingling with registered cows by
casturating the bull, a prosecution was instituted under the malicious
mischief statute. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
the conviction on the ground that no malice was shown toward the
owner of the bull The bull constituted a "private nuisance" and could
therefore be summarily abated by the aggrieved parties.
"'OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 513 (1961).
71The Statute provides that any person convicted of violating its provisions "... . shall be punished by a fine of not less than Ten Dollars
*

..

nor more than One Hundred Dollars... or, by imprisonment in

the county jail for thirty days, or by both imprisonment and fine."
7OKLA. STAT. tit. 29 § 409 (1961).
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provides that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission may be
called in to take corrective action to abate the pollution, or violators may be criminally prosecuted' The second statute specifically
makes it unlawful to permit any inflammable product from an oil
or gas well to drain into any tank, pool or stream which is used for
watering stock.74 It has been suggested that violation of this statute
is negligence per se,' but it has been held that there is no statutory
duty imposed upon the lessee to erect fences around a slush pit;
thus, evidence of failure to fence is not sufficient to permit recovery or injuries to livestock which drink from the pit.!6 This
section was not applicable in an action against an oil refinery for
injuries to cattle which drank from a pool of crude oil caused by
a drip in the refinery's pipe line." This does not mean that an oil
and gas lessee will not be liable for damages sustained by the surface owner whose cattle drink salt water which the lessee has permitted to flow over the leased land.' Furthermore, it has been held
that the fact that the landowner executes an oil and gas lease does
not in itself constitute consent for the lessee to pollute a stream
running through other parts of the lessor's land.' 9 Nor will the
fact that the plaintiff-lessor fails to separate the damages inflicted
by his own lessee from those caused by other leaseholders in the
area defeat his recovery for injuries to his livestock caused by the
leaseholders pollution of his water supply.'
In conclusion, the protection that the trespass laws afford the
ranchers and farmers of Oklahoma takes several different forms.
'3The penalty for violation of the statute is a fine not to exceed five

hundred dollars. The statute also provides that "... each day or part of
day during which such action is continued or repeated shall be a separate offense ... "
"OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 295 (1961).
75Lambert, Surface Rights of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKIA. L REV.
373, 382 (1958).
"Id. at 383.
"Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Helms, 207 Okla. 699, 252 P. 2d 447
(1953).
7'
Phillips Petroleum Co.v.Sheel, 208 Okla. 416, 256 P.2d 815 (1953).
7H.F.Wilcox Oil and Gas Co. v.Johnson, 184 Okla. 198, 86 P.2d 51
(1937).
"Commercial Drilling Co. v.McKee, 162 Okla. 204, 19 P. 2d 338
(1933).
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The protection may be against the unlawful intrusion by livestock
upon the lands of another. In this area we saw that the law imposed strict liability upon the owner of domestic animals for harms
resulting from his failure to keep the animals restrained within the
confines of his own land. Suits to recover damages resulting from
livestock trespass do not depend upon a showing of the owner's
negligence in allowing his livestock to escape unless the injured
person is outside the class of persons sought to be protected by the
enactment of the herd law. In the area of personal trespass the
landowner is protected not only from general trespass to his land
but is also protected from malicious injury to his real or personal
property. Other statutes provide protection in areas of indirect
trespass such as water pollution by oil field operations or other
activities which result in the contamination of state streams, lakes
and ponds.
The preceeding does not represent an exhaustive list of every
form of trespass that might, in one way or another, affect the
interests of the ranchers and farmers of this state. However, it is
hoped that this article will help in the understanding of what the
rights and liabilities in this area are and the extent to which the
law has sought to protect the interests of the owner or occupier
of land.
John Keefer
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